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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE OF CANADA: BOLD EXPERIMENT 
OR ACT OF FOLLY? 
H. W. Arthurs* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IN March 1967 labor-management relations in the Public Service of Canada entered a new era with the enactment of the federal 
Public Service Staff Relations Act.1 In a country whose social and 
economic policies have been stamped with an indelible tone of 
moderation and whose labor policies have hitherto been largely de-
rivative, the new statute must be regarded as profoundly significant. 
It establishes for employees of the Canadian federal government a 
regime of collective bargaining which in all essential respects parallels 
that prevailing in the private sector: exclusive representation rights 
for unions selected by a majority of employees in a bargaining unit; 
prohibition of employer unfair practices; and obligation to bargain 
in good faith; a right to strike which is inhibited only slighly by con-
siderations of national safety or security; and binding collective 
agreements which are enforceable through arbitration. 
Yet it must not be thought that the new statute was enacted 
without precedent or premeditation. Rather, it represented the 
logical culmination of developments in public employment collec-
tive bargaining reaching back a half century or more.2 Early Ca-
nadian industrial relations legislation, enacted during the first 
decade of this century, dealt specifically ·with strike situations in 
which the community had either a direct proprietary interest or a 
special concern arising out of the essential nature of the industries 
affected. Public utilities, railways, and coal mines were early identi-
fied as industries worthy of legislative intervention which, during 
these formative years, took the relatively innocuous form of compul-
sory strike postponement and conciliation. In the present context, 
it is particularly relevant that from the outset these federal statutes 
• Professor and Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, 
Toronto. B.A. 1955, LL.B. 1958, University of Toronto; LL.M. 1959, Harvard University. 
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1. C.72, [1966-67] Can. Stat. [hereinafter the Act]. The Public Service of Can-
ada is roughly analogous to the American Civil Service System. 
2. See generally Arthurs, Public Interest Labor Disputes in Canada: A Legislative 
Perspective, 17 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 39 (1967). 
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contemplated that employees of both private firms and government-
owned railways and municipally owned public utilities would be 
permitted to engage in collective bargaining. After an inhibiting 
constitutional decision which consigned jurisdiction over labor rela-
tions generally to the provinces rather than to the federal govem-
ment, 3 the provincial legislatures speedily enacted laws which once 
again brought municipal public utilities within the purview of 
federal conciliation procedures.4 Thus, even prior to the introduc-
tion of modem collective bargaining legislation, Canadians were 
accustomed to the use of a single statute to regulate labor relations 
in both the public and the private sectors. 
Ontario's enactment in 1943 of the first labor relations statute5 
on the Wagner Act model marked a significant development in 
Canadian industrial relations. Shortly thereafter, the federal govern-
ment, acting under its war emergency powers, virtually pre-empted 
provincial labor legislation by itself enacting regulations patterned 
after the Wagner Act.6 This new regulatory scheme covered the 
great bulk of the nation's workforce with the exception of provin-
cial and federal civil servants. Nevertheless, a number of unions 
representing municipal employees sought and obtained bargaining 
rights at this time,7 and their members have since enjoyed the normal 
collective bargaining regime which prevails in the private sector. 
The provinces reoccupied the legislative field after World War II, 
and over a period of years passed (or revived) a variety of strike 
postponement or strike prohibition statutes covering essential in-
dustries.8 Still, the practice of collective bargaining survived in these 
industries and even expanded-at least in seminal form-to include 
most provincial civil servants. 
During this period, at least one pioneering experiment in public 
sector unionism helped to eclipse once and for all the more conven-
tional view of employment relations between a sovereign state and 
its employees. In 1944, the people of Saskatchewan elected to office 
a CCF ( democratic socialist) government. This new government 
3. Snider v. Toronto Elec. Commr., [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5. 
4. See F. ANTON, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 74 (1962). 
5. Collective Bargaining Act, c.4, [1943] Ont. Stat. 11 (repealed 1944). 
6. Order-in-council P.C. 1003 (1944). 
7. See s. FRANKEL &: R. PRATT, MUNICIPAL LABOUR R:fil.ATIONS IN CANADA (1954); H. 
LOGAN, TRADE UNIONS IN CANADA: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONING 294 (1948). 
Among the municipalities whose employees were organized (as appears from reports 
of various Labour Relations Board decisions) were the cities of Toronto, and Tim-
mins, Ont., Winnipeg, Man., and Halifax, N.S. 
8. See Arthurs, supra note 2. 
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promptly enacted a statute on the model of the Wagner Act which 
it accepted unreservedly as applicable to provincial civil servants.9 
As a result, from 1944 until 1966 Saskatchewan treated public and 
private employment relations as indistinguishable. In 1966 a serious 
strike threatened the publicly owned Saskatchewan Power Cor-
poration; only then did the provincial government enact emergency 
dispute legislation10 which outlawed strikes endangering the public 
interest but did not othenvise interfere with collective bargaining. 
By 1966, the province of Quebec had similarly normalized its 
collective bargaining relations with unions representing public 
employees, subject only to fairly limited restraints on the timing 
and extent of strikes.11 By this time, as well, most provincial 
legislatures had brought municipal governments and their em-
ployees fully within the provisions of generally applicable collective 
bargaining statutes, subject only to legislation governing the right 
of essential employees to strike.12 
Three constitutional facts partially explain the relative ease 
with which collective bargaining spread at the municipal and pro-
vincial levels in Canada. First, the immunity of the state (in Ca-
nadian parlance, "the Crown") from general legal rules governing 
private relations is nothing more than a common-law principle 
which can be overridden simply by passing a statute. In Saskatche-
wan, for example, all that was necessary to extend collective bar-
gaining rights to public employees was for the legislature to define 
"employees" in such a way as to include those employed by the 
provincial government.13 Second, municipalities in Canada have 
never been regarded as sovereign political entities. Rather, they are 
creatures of provincial legislation, enjoying only such power as 
might be delegated to them by the province; a corollary is that they 
enjoy only those immunities conferred by the province.14 A third 
consideration, perhaps more practical than legal, is the position of 
the executive in a parliamentary system of government. By con-
9. Trade Union Act 1944, c.69, §§ 2(5)-(6), [1944] Sask. Stat. (2d. sess.) 207 [now 
SASK. REv. STAT. c. 287, §§ 2(e)-(f) (1965)]. 
10. The Essential Services Emergency Act 1966, c.2, [1966] Sask. Stat. (2d sess.) 2. 
11. Labor Code, QUE. REv. STAT. c.141, § 99 (1964), as amended, Act of June 17, 
1965, c.50, [1965] Que. Stat. (vol. 1) 461; Civil Service Act, c.14, §§ 68-75, [1965) Que. 
Stat. (vol. 1) 157. 
12. In Ontario, for example, a legislative provision enabling municipalities to opt 
out of the Labour Relations Act was repealed. Act of May 18, 1966, c.76, § 37, [1966] 
Ont. Stat. 311. 
13. This was accomplished through passage of the Trade Union Act 1944, c.69, 
§ 2(6), [1944] Sask. Stat. (2d sess.) 207 [now SASK. REv. STAT. c. 287, § 2(£) (1965)). 
14. I. ROGERS, THE LAW OF CANADIAN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 9-10 (1959). 
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stitutional custom, the party which enjoys the support of a majority 
in the legislature also controls the executive branch of government. 
Coupled with the fact that party discipline is strong, this means 
that, for practical purposes, the executive controls the legislative 
process. It would be unthinkable, then, for the legislature to refuse 
to honor an agreement negotiated by representatives of the govern-
ment. Although, as in a presidential system, the appropriation of 
funds is ultimately the prerogative of the legislators, in a parliamen-
tary sytsem they could refuse to honor the commitment of the exec-
utive only at the cost of bringing down the government and precipi-
tating an election. 
In addition, one potentially formidable obstacle to federal recog-
nition of the collective bargaining rights of public employees was 
simply not present in Canada in the mid-1960's. The traditional 
belief-or myth-that collective bargaining is somehow intrinsically 
incompatible with the dignity and functions of a sovereign state111 
had been subverted by years of practical experience with labor rela-
tions on the private sector model in governmental and quasi-
governmental employment. 
This brief background sketch of the Canadian labor relations 
scene suffices to indicate that several important impediments to the 
introduction of a full-fledged system of public service collective bar-
gaining which exist in the United States have no counterpart north 
of the border. Particularly at the practical level, there were no in-
superable hurdles to the enactment of the 1967 Canadian federal 
law. To understand how and why the new federal statute came to 
be enacted within this reasonably hospitable environment, it is 
important to trace the course of employment relations in the Cana-
dian Public Service. 
II. BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE OF CANADA16 
Employee organization in the Canadian Public Service began in 
1889 with the establishment of the Railway Mail Clerks Associa-
15. Cf. Finkelman, When Bargaining Fails, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE Pun• 
LIG SERVICE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 116, 120 (1967): 
To my mind, references to sovereignty in this connection have the effect ••• of 
anaesthetizing intelligent examination of the relations between employers and em-
ployees. • • . Ideological concepts such as sovereignty are often no more than 
political myths functioning to preserve the existing social structure. 
_(Professor Finkelman, formerly chairman of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, is 
now chairman of the Public Service Staff Relations Board). 
16. See generally REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITI'EE ON COLLECTIVE BAil· 
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tion. Postal employees soon formed similar organizations, and within 
twenty years significant beginnings of a general civil service associa-
tion had emerged; by 1920, even professional employees had formed 
an association. However, no significant formal machinery for labor-
management consultation at the federal level appeared until 1944. 
In that year, the federal government created the National Joint 
Council of the Public Service of Canada to advise it on wages and 
working conditions for its employees. Other bipartite advisory 
groups were established in the succeeding years; one of the most 
important was the Pay Research Bureau, whose function was the 
development of benchmarks for public employment conditions based 
on carefully selected private equivalences.17 Institutionally, the fed-
eral government's agreement in 1953 to the voluntary, revocable 
check-off of dues strengthened the various employee organizations. 
Whatever else these years of development represented, by the 
early 1960's there was not yet a regime of collective bargaining in 
the Public Service. The federal government continued to act uni-
laterally in fixing wages for its employees, although it was ostensibly 
committed to accepting the guidance of the Civil Service Commis-
sion. The Commission, in turn, engaged in consultation with the 
employee associations-initially on an informal basis, but after 1961 
pursuant to a statutory mandate.18 Needless to say, neither the strike 
weapon nor arbitration was considered an appropriate dispute reso-
lution mechanism when the Civil Service Commission and em-
ployee representatives failed to agree in the course of such consulta-
tions. Moreover, no formal mechanism had emerged which 
authoritatively determined the right of associations to speak on 
behalf of employees at the federal level or which protected the right 
of employees to join and participate in associations. However, it 
was not the lack of a legal mechanism for regulating relations be-
tween the Civil Service Commission and the employee associations 
which proved to be the fatal deficiency in this system. Rather, it 
was the fact that the Civil Service Commission had the power only 
to recommend to the federal government that the terms of employ-
ment agreed upon in consultation be implemented. 
GAINING IN THE PUBUC SERVICE 15-42 (Canada, 1965); Herman, Collective Bargaining 
by Civil Servants in Canada, in COLI.ECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBUC SERVICE; PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE I.R.R.A. 1966 ANNUAL SPRING MEETING 10, 15 (G. Somers ed. 1966). 
17. See text accompanying notes 81 and 82 infra. 
18. Civil Service Act, c!,7, § 7, [1960-61] Can. Stat. 381. This 1961 legislation contem-
plated, in addition to consultation between the Civil Service Commission and the em-
ployee associations, direct consultation between the government and the associations. 
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In 1963, the Conservative government then in power rejected a 
pay increase recommended by the Civil Service Commission after 
discussions with the employee associations. This action precipitated 
a crisis in public service employment relations at the federal level. 
By chance, this crisis coincided with a crisis in the political fortunes 
of the Conservative Party; soon afterward the government fell and a 
national election ensued. Since it followed the government's rejec-
tion of the "negotiated" recommendations of the Civil Service Com-
mission, the election provided a convenient occasion for the discus-
sion of full-blown collective bargaining rights for federal public 
servants. Each of the three major political parties responded to 
public inquiries from the civil service unions by supporting a 
system of collective bargaining in which compulsory arbitration 
would be used to resolve negotiation impasses. The Liberal Party 
won the 1963 election and, after taking office, appointed the Prepara-
tory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public Service to 
investigate the technical problems of ful:lilling its election pledge. 
One particular feature of the new Liberal cabinet must be men-
tioned here, because it helps to explain not only the forthright dis-
charge of an election promise, but also the nature of the committee 
appointed. The Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, was himself a 
former civil servant, as~were a number of his senior cabinet min-
isters. Given this affinity between the political leaders of the country 
and their former colleagues in the federal civil service, it is not 
surprising that they took immediate steps to harmonize government-
employee relations. Similarly, it is not surprising that the committee 
appointed for the purpose of executing this mission was comprised 
almost entirely of senior public servants. The Chairman of the 
Preparatory Committee, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, was an outstanding 
and widely respected civil servant who had served the Government 
of Canada for almost thirty years; other members of the Committee 
included the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury Board,19 and senior management-level civil 
servants from a number of other important government depart-
ments. In addition, the Preparatory Committee sought and obtained 
assistance from a number of academic experts, management and 
labor professionals, and respected labor neutrals. Of course, the 
committee also consulted actively with various employee associa-
tions in the public service and with the national labor centers. 
19. See text accompanying notes 28 and 29 infra. 
March 1969] The Public Service of Canada 977 
The Preparatory Committee saw its task as essentially a tech-
nical one: How best might collective bargaining be implemented in 
the Public Service? Virtually absent from the Committee's report 
(and presumably also from its deliberations) was any discussion of 
the fundamental, underlying political issue of whether public ser-
vants should be permitted to engage in the process of collective 
bargaining. This issue was taken to have been settled by the events 
of the preceding months. Accordingly, the Committee recommended 
in July 1965 a complete system of collective bargaining for all fed-
eral government departments and agencies not falling within the 
scope of the general federal labor relations statute applicable to 
private employers and certain public service enterprises.20 The Com-
mittee proposed binding arbitration as the central method of impasse 
resolution for both grievances and interest disputes. 
However well conceived this system of compulsory arbitration 
might have been, a successful seventeen-day postal strike rendered it 
obsolete within a matter of weeks. This strike drastically trans-
formed the attitudes of both employers and employee representa-
tives toward the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee. 
In its report, the Committee had declined to recommend an explicit 
legislative prohibition against public employee strikes: 
Looking at the recent history of the Public Service, we concluded 
that it would be difficult to justify a prohibition on grounds of 
demonstrated need. We concluded also that, if a strike should ever 
occur, the Government would not be without means to cope with 
it. At the present time, most of the employees to whom the proposed 
system would apply do not have a "right to strike" and would be 
subject to disciplinary action by the employer if they were to par-
ticipate in a strike. Nothing in the recommendations of the Com-
mittee is intended to change the position.21 
The postal strike revealed the unintentional irony of this state-
ment. Considerable public sympathy for the strikers forced the 
government to appoint, as "the means to cope with the strike," a 
fact-finding commission which largely vindicated the postal workers' 
position. Although the Preparatory Committee had pointed out that 
public service strikers would not be exercising a "right to strike"22 
and would theoretically be subject to disciplinary action, the gov-
ernment realized that it could not, as a practical matter, suspend or 
20. Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c.152 
(1952). 
21. REPORT, supra note 16, at 36-37. 
22. Here the distinction between "right" and "privilege" becomes razor thin. 
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discharge thousands of employees. Consequently, it confronted the 
necessity of thinking the unthinkable and legalizing the illegal. At 
the same time, the success of the postal strike and the growing identi-
fication of public employees with the main body of the Canadian 
labor movement combined to persuade other civil service employee 
associations to -demand the right to strike instead of compul-
sory arbitration. Even private sector unions, undoubtedly anxious 
to avoid the precedent of a statute denying the right to strike, vigor-
ously protested the proposals for compulsory arbitration.23 
As a result of this pressure, the Preparatory Committee sub-
stantially altered its original proposals. When draft legislation was 
ultimately introduced in Parliament, it contained a novel formula 
under which a union could elect, upon certification, to resort either 
to binding arbitration or to the strike.24 After appropriate prelimi-
nary formalities, the draft statute was sent to a joint committee of 
the Senate and House of Commons for study. Since a parliamentary 
majority continued to elude the Liberal government, which held a 
mere plurality rather than a majority of seats, there was a risk that 
the deliberations of the joint committee on this controversial mea-
sure might be used for political harassment. However, a genuine 
nonpartisan atmosphere prevailed. The legislators sought and 
weighed the advice of employer and employee representatives in a 
frank and friendly manner, and all of the participants in the work 
of the joint committee made contributions which sometimes con-
stituted significant amendments to the original scheme of the legisla-
tion. To a large extent, the manner of the statute's enactment as 
much as the merit of its substantive provisions gives hope that the 
Public Service Staff Relations Act will in fact prove workable. So 
far, the predominant attitude of those engaged in administering 
the Act and in representing the interest groups subject to its pro-
visions seems to be one of good faith and self-restraint. 
III. THE PUBLIC SERVICE STAFF RELATIONS ACT 
A. Coverage 
The Public Service Staff Relations Act applies to all employees 
in the Public Service of Canada, either in the central administra-
23. See Herman, supra note 16, at 22; Love, Proposals for Collective Bargaining in 
the Public Service: A Further Commentary, in CoLI.ECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 16, 
at 24, 26. 
24. See text accompanying notes 67-71 infra. It may be significant that the first 
lawful strike under the new statute was conducted by the very group of employees 
whose unlawful strike had prompted this fundamental change in the legislative scheme 
-the postal employees. See page 992 infra. 
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tion, or in one of several autonomous agencies. The Act defines 
the "employer" by reference to two lists, one of government depart-
ments and agencies forming part of the central administration, and 
the other of autonomous agencies identified as "separate employ-
ers."25 Within the central administration, the Treasury Board per-
forms the employer function; the separate employers conduct their 
own labor relations. There seems to have been little rational basis for 
assigning a given agency to one or the other list of employers,26 and it 
must be assumed that the two lists reflect established traditions or 
political sensitivities which caused some agencies to have greater 
autonomy than others. It should also be noted that a number of 
government-owned corporations, such as the Canadian National 
Railway and Air Canada, fall under general federal labor relations 
legislation. 27 
The Treasury Board, comprised of a committee of senior cabinet 
ministers chaired by a president, has its own staff28 which represents 
its "client" agencies before the various tribunals established under 
the Act, conducts labor negotiations, and monitors employment con-
ditions and grievance-handling procedures at the departmental 
level. The Treasury Board represents a tendency toward centraliza-
tion, modernization, and professionalization of personnel manage-
ment. Still, individual government departments and agencies-in-
cluding those represented by the Treasury Board-tend to value 
their traditional autonomy and to cling to pre-collective bargaining 
habits of employer-employee relations. To what extent these sep-
arate departmental foci of power can be displaced by the central 
staff of the Treasury Board is more than a mere practical or political 
problem. It also involves policy considerations as to whether, or to 
what extent, specialized needs and wishes of various branches of the 
Public Service should give way in the interest of national con-
formity. The potential for conflict created by this arrangement is 
25. § 2(o) of the Act. 
26. For example, the Dominion Coal Board and the National Energy Board are 
both part of the central administration, while the Atomic Energy Control Board is 
not; the National Film Board is a separate employer, while the National Gallery and 
the National Library are part of the central administration. 
27. Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, CAN. R.Ev. STAT. c.152 (1952). 
28. In fact, the Treasury Board has existed since the establishment of the first 
Canadian Parliament after confederation in 1867; in a broad sense, it has always 
been responsible for government finances, see Address by D. J. Love, The Personnel 
Policy Branch of the Treasury Board: Its Mission, Character and Organization, Public 
Personnel Association, Ottawa, Oct. 1967. The statutory authority for the Treasury 
Board, and a definition of its function, is found in the Financial Administration Act, 
CAN. R.Ev. STAT. c.116 (1952). 
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obvious, and it would be more serious if it were not for the extreme 
delicacy shown by the Treasury Board staff in its relations with the 
"client" departments of government.29 
Very few categories of public "employees" other than managerial 
personnel are denied the right of collective bargaining under the 
Act,30 and the statutory definition of managerial personnel is so 
narrow that the exception covers only a minimum number of per-
sons.31 In this connection, it is important to emphasize that there 
existed in the Canadian Public Service a long-standing tradition to 
link managerial and nonmanagerial personnel together in various 
employee associations. The survival of this tradition in the face of 
a more recent prohibition against management intervention in the 
affairs of employee associations may prove to be a matter of some 
controversy.32 However, the situation is not without its parallels 
in the private sector, and it seems likely that over a period of time 
managerial and bargaining unit personnel will by a process of at-
trition become more clearly disassociated. The one area in which 
this process may be slow is among professional and scientific person-
nel who are bound together by interests and qualifications which 
transcend the employment relationship.33 
29. See Love, supra note 28; Davidson, Critical Issues in Collective Bargaining in 
the Canadian Federal Service, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TIIE PUBUC SERVICE: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 163 (1967). 
30. Section 2(m) of the Act, which exempts managerial personnel, also exempts 
casual, part-time and temporary employees, persons compensated by fees of office, and 
uniformed members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
31. Section 2(u) of the Act defines a "person employed in a managerial or confi• 
dential capacity" as someone who is in a position confidential to a federal judge, 
minister, or deputy minister [who are themselves excluded by section 2(m)(i)], legal 
officers in the Department of Justice, and a person who is designated by the employer 
and found by the PSSRB 
to be a person 
(iii) who has executive duties and responsibilities in relation to the development 
and administration of government programs, 
(iv) whose duties include those of a personnel administrator or who has duties 
that cause him to be directly involved in the process of collective bargaining 
on behalf of the employer, 
(v) who is required • • • to deal formally in behalf of the employer with a 
grievance .... 
(vi) who is not otherwise described . . . but who in the opinion of the Board 
should not be included in a bargaining unit by reason of his duties and re-
sponsibilities to the employer . . • . 
32. See Davidson, supra note 29, at 167-69. 
33. The Professional Institute of the Public Service, a long-established organization 
which represents several bargaining units, anticipated this problem by providing 
"affiliate membership" for persons ineligible for inclusion in a bargaining unit. See 
PROCEEDINGS, SPECIAL JOINT CoMMITrEE OF THE SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
ON EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBUC SERVICE OF CANADA 416-17, 425-28 
(1966). The Civil Service Association of Canada, a major service.wide organization, 
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B. Administration 
The Act is administered by the Public Service Staff Relations 
Board (PSSRB), an independent administrative tribunal. In the 
common Canadian mode, the PSSRB is tripartite in composition, 
with two neutral presiding officers and an equal number of mem-
bers "representative ... of the interests of employees and of ... 
the employer."34 To ensure the neutral members' independence, 
they hold office for ten years and can be removed only by the pro-
cedure applicable to the removal of judges. The partisan members 
hold office for up to seven years, subject to removal by the cabinet 
"for cause.''35 
Both the Arbitration Tribunal, which deals with interest dis-
putes, 36 and a corps of adjudicators, who deal with grievances,37 
operate under the administrative aegis of the PSSRB.38 The Board 
itself appoints members of the Arbitration Tribunal39 and nomi-
nates its chairman for appointment by the federal cabinet;40 the 
Board also nominates adjudicators for cabinet appointment.41 More-
over, the chairman of the PSSRB is empowered to appoint concilia-
tors and expert or technical assistants.42 The Preparatory Committee 
presumably devised this arrangement in order to strengthen the inde-
pendence and impartiality of the Board. The Committee noted that 
the Minister of Labour could hardly be expected to assume adminis-
trative responsibility for such "third party" functions as conciliation, 
which normally are not performed by a labor relations board at all. 
Unlike the private sector, in public employment the government does 
not "stand between an employer and a group of organized employees 
in a position of impartiality .... "43 Thus, it can be fairly said that 
the administration of the Act is almost completely free of public 
employer control or influence.44 The importance of this point for 
also sought to ensure the continued membership of non-bargaining unit personnel. Id. 
at 232-33. 
34. § 11(1). 
35. §§ 11(2)-(3). 
36. See text accompanying notes 83 and 84 infra. 
37. See text accompanying notes 102-16 infra. 
38. The Pay Research Bureau is also administered under the PSSRB. 
39. § 60(1) of the Act. 
40. § 60(2) of the Act. 
41. § 92 of the Act. 
42. § 17(4) of the Act. 
43. REPORT, supra note 16, at 25. 
44. The caliber of appointments made to the PSSRB and its adjunct bodies like-
wise helps to explain their impartiality and independence. The chairman of the 
PSSRB-the central figure in the entire scheme-is Jacob Finkelman, a former law 
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the "normalization" of employer-employee relations in the public 
sector can hardly be overemphasized. The Canadian arrangement is 
far more likely to win the confidence of public employees than the 
typical advisory body in the United States. Such bodies, often created 
by executive order, depend for their very existence on the grace and 
favor of the appointing power, and public employees, not surpris-
ingly, may sometimes feel that their recommendations are not com-
pletely unbiased. 
Not directly involved in the scheme of collective bargaining, but 
very definitely a part of the environment of employer-employee rela-
tions at the federal level, is the Public Service Commission. This 
Commission administers the Public Service Employment Act,45 
which establishes and implements the civil service or "merit" 
system of appointments and promotions, and provides a vehicle 
for employee training and development programs. This area of 
responsibility is much smaller than that exercised by the old Civil 
Service Commission prior to the advent of collective bargaining in 
the public sector. However, there are still problems of delimiting 
the jurisdictional boundaries between the Public Service Commis-
sion and the other bodies engaged in administering the collective 
bargaining relationship. 
C. Establishing the Bargaining Relationship: Operative 
Provisions of the A ct 
Under the Act, a certified bargaining agent enjoys exclusive 
bargaining rights for all employees within an appropriate bargain-
ing unit for both negotiation and grievance purposes,46 subject only 
to timely displacement by a rival union47 or to revocation of certi-
fication because of loss of support,48 fraud,49 or abandonment.50 The 
Act requires certification as a basis for all bargaining relationships51 
in order to avoid the risk that the employer will deal with a favored 
union which does not enjoy the support of a majority of employees. 
teacher and for many years chairman of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the 
nation's busiest labor tribunal. The chairman of the Arbitration Tribunal is Justice 
Andre Monpettit of the Superior Court of Quebec, an experienced labor mediator. 
45. C.71, § 2, [1966-67] Can. Stat. 
46. § 40(l)(a) of the Act. 
47. § 40(l)(b) of the Act. 
48. § 41(4) of the Act. 
49. § 43 of the Act. 
50. § 42 of the Act. 
51. § 49 of the Act. 
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In this respect, the federal public service legislation differs from 
comparable private sector statutes which permit voluntary recogni-
tion. The Act does not specify the method by which a union is to 
demonstrate its majority status on an application for certification. 
However, the Board has adopted a rule of thumb which accords 
certification outright to unions which can demonstrate a member-
ship exceeding fifty-two per cent of the employees in the bargaining 
unit; unions which can demonstrate substantial (but lesser) support 
must submit to a secret ballot vote.52 
After the Act became operative, considerable controversy arose 
as to which employee organizations were eligible for certification. 
The stakes were high, since disqualification would preclude an or-
ganization from participating in the race to win bargaining rights 
for virtually the entire Public Service. Three related cases illustrate 
the problems presented.53 In anticipation of the new statute, several 
major public service employee associations had joined together to 
form the Public Service Alliance of Canada. In the Hospital Services 
case, the constitutionality of this coalition was challenged and the 
evidence of membership tendered by the group was impugned. 
The PSSRB sustained the Alliance on both counts, declining 
to evaluate the internal mechanisms by which the former organiza-
tions had agreed to merge, and accepting as evidence of continuing 
membership in the Alliance dues checked off after the merger on 
the basis of premerger authorizations. An adverse ruling would 
have prevented some of the major intended beneficiaries of the Act 
-the former employer associations--from participating in the criti-
cal contests for initial certification merely because they had combined. 
In the Ships' Crews case it was argued that a union which comprised 
both civil servants and private sector employees was ineligible for cer-
tification. The fear was that such a union might be unresponsive, 
or possibly inimical, to the interests of the Public Service. The 
Board also rejected this contention, finding in the legislative history 
of the Act no intention to grant a monopoly of representation 
52. It should be noted that the logistics of taking a vote present potentially stag-
gering problems. How should the Board conduct a ballot of ships' crews on a number 
of vessels which may be on the high seas for months at a time? What of lighthouse 
keepers who are virtually inaccessible except by helicopter? In such difficult circum-
stances, problems of communication and of the integrity of the secret ballot have 
been met with considerable ingenuity by the Board and with some degree of realism 
by the parties. 
53. To date, the PSSRB has made copies of its significant decisions available on 
request. Publication and distribution of a formal series of reports will begin in the 
near future. 
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rights to the old-line civil service associations. However, the Board 
warned that the status of a union representing both public and 
private employees might be jeopardized should the Board find that 
extrinsic considerations were interfering with its representation of 
public employees. Finally, the Council of Postal Unions case raised 
the fundamental question whether certification should be granted to 
a union which disenfranchised certain persons within the bargain-
ing unit which it claimed to represent. Here the Board drew the 
line, insisting that upon certification the union was required to 
accord membership rights to all employees in the bargaining unit.54 
In the same case, the PSSRB insisted that a newly formed Council 
of Postal Unions be established according to constitutional processes 
through which each constituent member would be required to par-
ticipate in collective bargaining. 
Definition of the appropriate unit for bargaining is a potentially 
difficult problem because of the unity of the management structure 
(at least in the central administration), and the need to preserve 
uniformity of employment conditions within the Public Service. 
The process is complicated by geographic dispersion of employees, 
the nationalist impulse among federal employees in Quebec, fear 
among some occupational groups that they will be burdened with 
the lesser bargaining power of other groups, and other strong 
centrifugal forces. In order to save the PSSRB from dealing with 
these problems during the hectic period immediately after the in-
troduction of collective bargaining into the Public Service, the Act 
established a number of statutory bargaining units for the duration 
of the "initial certification period.''55 These statutory bargaining 
units reflected a new system of job classification which had been in-
troduced by the Civil Service Commission in 1964. The Act divided 
the central administration into seventy-two functional groups and 
then clustered these groups into five broad occupational categories: 
scientific and professional, administrative and foreign service, tech-
nical, administrative support, and operational. During the initial 
certification period the Board was obliged to adhere to these statu-
tory bargaining units unless it determined "that such a bargaining 
54. Section 39(3) of the Act explicitly makes ineligible for certification any union 
"that discriminates against any employee because of sex, race, national origin, colour, 
or religion." 
55. Section 26 of the Act authorizes the Public Service Commission to "specify and 
define the several occupational groups within each occupational category" established 
by the statute. During the initial certification period these occupational groups are 
intended to be coterminous with bargaining units. 
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unit would not permit satisfactory representation of employees ... 
and ... would not constitute a unit of employees appropriate for 
collective bargaining,"56 or unless it became necessary to divide an 
occupational group into separate supervisory and nonsupervisory 
bargaining units. The initial certification period for each broad oc-
cupational category was to last for a period of approximately twenty 
months. Thereafter, upon application, the PSSRB could redefine 
bargaining units so long as it maintained the integrity of the broad 
occupational categories established by the statute.57 Moreover, in the 
interest of uniformity throughout the Public Service, the Board was 
required to "have regard to" the nature of the established classifica-
tion structure in any redefinition of bargaining units.58 
Given the enormous tasks associated with bringing the legisla-
tion into operation, the idea of the initial certification period seems 
sound. Imposition of predetermined boundaries on bargaining units 
undoubtedly inhibited some employees from associating together 
for collective bargaining purposes, but it did expedite the certifica-
tion process, and in the long run probably strengthened the collec-
tive bargaining system. Moreover, the experience gained during the 
initial certification period will presumably aid the Board should 
subsequent redefinitions of the appropriate units for bargaining 
prove necessary. To date, virtually all occupational groups within 
the central administration and among the separate employers have 
applied for certification. The Board has granted certificates to 
seventy-five bargaining units, comprising approximately eighty per 
cent of the 206,000 eligible employees in the Public Service.59 
D. Protection of Basic Rights 
The basic approach of the Preparatory Committee which pro-
posed the Act was to seek normalization of labor relations in the 
Public Service: 
Legislation governing industrial relations in the private sector 
usually contains a number of provisions designed to protect the 
integrity of the collective bargaining relationship, including: a 
declaration of the freedom of employees to belong to any organiza-
tion of their choice; a prohibition of employer interference in the 
56. § 26(5)(a) of the Act. 
57. § 32 of the Act. 
58. § 32(2) of the Act. 
59. Approximately 170,000 employees are now included in bargaining units. Of 
these, 120,000 are represented by the Public Service Alliance of Canada (successor to 
the pre-collective bargaining employee associations), and 25,000 are represented by the 
Council of Postal Unions. 
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organization or administration of any employee organization; and 
an assurance that employees may exercise their rights without 
threats, intimidation or reprisals from agents of employee organiza-
tions or the employer. 
In the opinion of the Preparatory Committee, the principles 
underlying provisions of this kind are of fundamental importance 
and should be made to apply clearly to the Public Service system.60 
The legislation, as finally enacted, reflects this basic philosophy of 
the Preparatory Committee. The Act clearly proclaims freedom of 
employee association61 and forbids interference with that freedom 
by managerial personnel. In particular, the Act prohibits employer 
domination of unions,62 discrimination in employment against 
unionists, and other analogous coercive tactics. 63 These prohibitions 
are enforceable by a procedure for filing complaints against the em-
ployer and any person acting on its behalf.64 
The PSSRB has jurisdiction to hear and determine such com-
plaints, to make remedial orders, and to invoke two different sanc-
tions to ensure compliance. The Board may either make a report 
of noncompliance to Parliament65 (which would undoubtedly be 
extremely embarrassing to the government) or consent to the prose-
cution of any individual who has violated the prohibitions con-
tained in the Act. 66 However, beyond reporting to Parliament, no 
sanctions are directly available against the government itself. It is 
clear that conformity to the policy of the law ultimately depends on 
the government's willingness to comply rather than the fear of sanc-
tions. Isolated acts of antiunionism are likely to occur, if at all, at 
the lower echelons of management or at points geographically re-
mote from the main administrative centers. If the Treasury Board 
is able to assume control over such situations and to apply the neces-
60. REPORT, supra, note 16, at 26. 
61. § 6 of the Act. 
62. § 8(1) of the Act. 
63. § 8(2) of the Act. 
64. § 20 of the Act. 
65. § 21 of the Act. 
66. § 106 of the Act. The statute does not explicitly indicate that unfair practices 
or violations of remedial orders are criminal offenses, although reference is made in 
section 106 to "prosecution arising out of an alleged failure to observe any prohibition 
contained in section 8." Section 107 of the Criminal Code, c.51, [1953-54] Can. Stat. 365. 
provides: "Everyone who ... contravenes an Act of the Parliament of Canada ••• is, 
unless some penalty or punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable 
offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years," Presumably, prosecution under 
this section is contemplated; certainly, the legislative intention was that prosecution 
should be the ultimate enforcement procedure. See Proceedings, supra note 33, at 917. 
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sary corrective measures, effective self-policing on the employer side 
will make it unnecessary to invoke the enforcement machinery of 
the statute. To date, there have been few complaints of unfair labor 
practices, and the enforcement provisions of the Act have not been 
invoked. 
E. Collective Bargaining: Arbitration or Strike? 
The Act requires both the employing agency and the bargaining 
agent, upon timely notice, "to bargain collectively in good faith and 
make every reasonable effort to conclude a collective agreement."67 
As a reflection of the statute's general adherence to private sector 
principles, this admonition is hardly surprising. It is the procedure 
for impasse resolution which represents the most novel (and, some 
say, the most radical) feature of the statute. Following certification, 
the bargaining agent for each certified union is required to choose 
between two procedures "for resolution of any dispute to which it 
may be a party": 68 arbitration or a process of conciliation.69 
Since arbitral awards are "binding on the employer and the bar-
gaining agent ... and on the employees,"70 choice of the arbitration 
option forecloses the possibility of a strike.71 However, no compara-
ble binding effect accompanies the report of a conciliation board, 
and there are no prohibitions elsewhere in the ·statute which would 
preclude a post-conciliation strike. By inference, then, strikes are 
permitted following exhaustion of the conciliation process. 
The failure to announce affirmatively the existence of a right to 
strike is hardly surprising. In the first place, no Canadian court has 
ever clearly held that strikes by public servants are per se illegal;72 
thus there was no need for Parliament to reverse an existing legal 
norm. Second, while it is true that Canadian labor relations statutes 
have seldom contained an express reference to the right to strike, 
the courts have recognized that such legislation impliedly incorpo-
rates the common-law right to strike.73 
The Act does not, however, entirely abandon the public interest 
in the continued operation of government to the whim of nego-
67. § 50 of the Act. 
68. § 36(1) of the Act. 
69. § 2(w) of the Act. 
70. § 72(1) of the Act. 
71. This point is made explicit by section I0I(l)(b) of the Act. 
72. The issue was raised, and avoided, in A. G. British Columbia v. Ellsay ie B.C. 
Govt. Employees Assn. [1959] CLLC 15,262 (B.C. Sup. Ct.). 
73. Regina v. CPR ex rel. Zambri, [1962] S.C.R. 609. 
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tiators. If a union has elected to resolve its collective bargaining 
impasses by a process of conciliation-and, impliedly, by a strike-
rather than by arbitration, the Act forbids certain "designated em-
ployees" within the bargaining unit from striking because their 
duties "consist in whole or in part of duties the performance of 
which at any particular time or after any specified period of time 
is or will be necessary in the interest of the safety or security of the 
public."74 But it should be noted that the definition of "designated 
employees" is very circumscribed. The Act denies the right to strike 
only to those persons whose absence from work would imperil in-
terests which are absolutely vital; employees whose absence would 
merely imperil the "public interest," "convenience," or "welfare" 
are still permitted to strike. 
The procedure for identifying "designated employees" is de-
signed to avoid controversy over this issue during the course of a 
strike when the pressures of conflict would make resolution of the 
matter especially difficult. Within twenty days after either party has 
served a notice to bargain, the employing agency must establish a 
list of essential employees. If the union does not object to the em-
ployer's list, all of the persons so identified are taken to be "desig-
nated." However, in the event that the bargaining agent files an 
objection, the Board must hold a hearing to determine whether the 
listed employees are really essential to the "safety and security of 
the public." 
In practice, the various government employers have exercised 
great self-restraint in designating critical employees. Of approxi-
mately 33,000 employees in bargaining units governed by the strike 
option, the government has "designated" only eighty-six. In each 
case, the union has accepted the employer's unilateral judgment. 
Thus, the Board has not had occasion to determine authoritatively 
the meaning of the statutory phrase "safety and security of the pub-
lic." Nevertheless, some clue to the meaning of this standard may be 
gleaned from the Air Traffic Controllers case,75 where the only 
"designated" employees were those controllers thought necessary to 
provide emergency assistance to overflying and noncommercial air-
craft at various airports throughout the country. Obviously, such a 
small number of "designated" controllers would be inadequate to 
service regular domestic commercial air traffic, which would neces-
74. § 79 of the Act. 
75. See note 53 supra. 
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sarily be suspended for the duration of a strike within this particu-
lar bargaining unit.76 
The Act does not expressly provide for the designation of addi-
tional employees during a strike if the employing agency or the 
Board initially misjudged the number or type of employees neces-
sary to protect the public interest. The PSSRB would undoubtedly 
mobilize its full statutory resources to cope with such a crisis, in-
cluding its power to "review, rescind, amend, alter or vary any 
decision or order made by it."77 It might well be argued that 
the employer and the Board should have anticipated all contin-
gencies in making the original choice of designated employees, 
but this argument might have the unfortunate effect of prompting 
the employer to exaggerate at the outset the number of designated 
employees on the basis of remote contingencies. 
A second series of problems concerns the relationship between 
striking employees and designated employees in the same bargaining 
unit. If a government employer determines that a skeleton staff is 
necessary during a strike in order to provide services essential to 
the "safety and security of the public," how is such a staff to be 
selected from among the employees in a bargaining unit? What hap-
pens if some of the designated employees resign or become ill? 
Must the same individuals continue to work throughout the strike, 
or can the strikers serve in rotation? What of the risks of sabotage, 
deliberate slow-dmms, or "work-to-rule" campaigns by designated 
employees? And what of the wages paid to designated employees: 
if the remuneration for continuing on the job exceeds strike pay, 
should the designated employees be required to tum the surplus 
over to the union strike fund? Although these as yet unanswered 
questions are potentially troublesome, the statutory procedure for 
designating employees in advance of an actual strike situation is 
fundamentally sound. The fact that the parties are not locked in 
conflict makes it more likely that they will agree upon the list of 
designated employees. If there is disagreement, the Board can under-
take the difficult adjudicative problems of defining and identifying 
employees in essential services without the extra pressure of a strike 
situation. Finally, if a large proportion of employees in a bargaining 
unit must be designated as essential, thus impairing the union's 
76. Air travellers who have been trapped for hours on the runways and in the 
air corridors of New York airports because of a "work-to-rule" campaign by air 
traffic controllers might regard an outright strike as a lesser evil. 
77. § 25 of the Act. 
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ability to strike, that fact is made obvious so that the union can opt 
for arbitration at an early stage in the proceedings. 
Of the fifty-three bargaining units which had elected between 
arbitration and conciliation as of August 31, 1968, only eight had 
chosen the latter method of impasse resolution. The forty-five units 
which selected arbitration contained 79,000 employees, while the 
eight strike-potential units encompassed 33,000 employees; of the 
latter, some 25,000 were postal workers. Since no election has yet 
been made in another twenty-nvo units containing almost 56,000 
employees, the predominant pattern of impasse resolution is still 
to be determined. Obviously, the developing course of negotiations 
under the two systems of dispute resolution will directly influence 
not only the choices of the remaining undecided units but also the 
decisions of units which may want to alter their previous elections.78 
To date, experience under each system has been relatively satis-
factory. It has frequently been suggested that when the possibility 
of a strike is removed, collective bargaining will deteriorate because 
the disputing parties will prefer to take their chances with an arbi-
trator rather than to conclude an agreement through direct negotia-
tions.79 However, the limited experience under the Public Service 
Staff Relations Act suggests that arbitration does not necessarily 
spell the end of real collective bargaining. Some twenty agreements 
covering 55,000 employees have now been signed in bargaining 
units governed by the arbitration option. Of these, all but two or 
three were the product of direct negotiations unassisted by even a 
conciliator;80 the Arbitration Tribunal has yet to hear a single case. 
To be sure, several unusual circumstances may have contributed 
to the enviable record of the bargaining units which opted for arbi-
tration. First, it must be remembered that the unions concerned 
have voluntarily abandoned their right to strike. It might be as-
sumed, therefore, that they have decided to approach collective 
bargaining in a more responsible, less militant, manner than their 
private sector or strike-potential, public sector counterparts. Second, 
the government is aware that disillusionment with bargaining under 
the arbitration option would surely lead a union to change its 
option at the earliest opportunity. Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
78. Section 38 of the Act provides for alteration of the process of dispute resolu-
tion. 
79. See K.heel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931, 938, 939-40 
(1969). 
80. Under section 52 of the Act, either party may apply to the Chairman of the 
PSSRB for "the assistance of a conciliator in reaching agreement," although appoint-
ment of a conciliator is not mandatory. 
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assume that the government's bargaining stance has been one of 
flexibility and restraint. 
Beyond these short-run considerations, the institutional arrange-
ments provided by the statute undoubtedly contribute to the amica-
ble settlement of disputes. Perhaps most important in this regard 
is the provision of a factual framework for enlightened bargaining. 
The Pay Research Bureau, established in 1957, has obtained the 
cooperation and confidence of the government and the employee 
associations both in gathering and in disseminating data useful in 
the bargaining process.81 By largely removing factual issues from 
the realm of controversy, the Bureau enables negotiators to focus 
attention on the admittedly difficult task of choosing the criteria by 
which those facts are to be evaluated. Second, if the parties fail to 
resolve their differences in direct negotiation, the dispute does not 
pass directly to arbitration. Instead, the Act provides for the inter-
vention of a conciliator on the request of either party.82 Only if the 
conciliator fails to bring the parties together does the focus shift 
from bargaining to binding third-party determination. 
If and when it is necessary to resort to arbitration, the Act con-
tains elaborate provisions to ensure that the issue will be clearly 
and narrowly defined for the arbitrator.83 The Arbitration Tri-
bunal, moreover, is not simply left to speculate upon the principles 
by which public employment working conditions are to be fixed. 
The Act provides the Arbitration Tribunal-and presumably nego-
tiators seeking to avoid arbitration-with specific criteria for de-
termining wages and working conditions.84 While these standards 
are admittedly broad, they at least constitute an attempt by Parlia-
ment to discharge its legislative obligations by stating that public 
employees are to enjoy employment conditions comparable to those 
in the private sector. Coupled with the data generated by the Pay 
Research Bureau and submitted to the scrutiny of an Arbitration 
Tribunal staffed by highly competent men, these legislative guide-
lines are likely to produce a decision which the disputants will 
respect. Certainly, neither party need fear that arbitration involves 
risks of irresponsible or ill-informed third-party determinations. In-
deed, the very rationality of the arbitration process may encourage 
81. See Gauthier, Pay Research and Employee Relations in the Canadian Federal 
Service, in K. ,VARNER &: J. DONOVAN, PRACTICAL GUIDELINES TO PUBLIC PAY AnMIN• 
ISTRATION 156 (1965). 
82. § 52 of the Act. 
83. See Kheel, supra note 79, at 939, 941. 
84. § 68 of the Act. 
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the parties to simulate it in private negotiations, and thus avoid 
arbitration altogether. 
In the case of bargaining units which opted for the right to 
strike, the experience to date is somewhat less than conclusive. 
While the air traffic controllers were able to negotiate an agree-
ment without recourse to a strike, 25,000 postal workers who ap-
parently felt obliged to employ the ultimate sanction called a postal 
strike which lasted for nineteen days-from July 18 to August 8, 
1968. This was hardly a surprising development. In 1965 the postal 
workers had resorted to a seventeen-day walkout; on several other 
occasions, national and local union groups had threatened strike 
action. A number of factors contributed to the militancy of these 
groups: deep-seated grievances against poor working conditions; de-
partmental management which was understaffed and ill-prepared for 
collective bargaining; a new union leadership cognizant of the fact 
that their predecessors had been purged as "moderates"; and over-
tones of French Canadian nationalism in the Montreal local union. 
Circumstances beyond the immediate control of the parties added 
several ingredients to this witches' brew: a federal election occurred 
in the midst of bargaining; a new Postmaster-General took office; 
critics called for an overhaul of postal services and mail rates; and 
the government attempted to restrain inflation by encouraging a 
policy of wage restraint throughout the economy. 
Bargaining began at a slow, almost fatalistic pace. While the 
parties made some progress on minor items, and although a board 
of conciliation succeeded in resolving other issues, the government 
made no response to the union's unrealistically high wage demand 
until the very eve of the strike. Predictably, this last-minute move 
proved "too little, too late," and the first legal strike of Canadian 
federal workers began. Much more unpredictable was the compara-
tively mild reaction of the Canadian public. To some extent, the 
press was sympathetic to the grievances of the employees and critical 
of the government's failure to make an earlier wage offer; thus, it 
initially adopted a fairly neutral attitude. Having learned the les-
sons of the previous mail strike in 1965, many businesses had made 
arrangements to continue serving customers and collecting accounts 
for the duration of the strike. Welfare agencies and similar organiza-
tions also provided emergency services to their clientele through 
alternate devices. While there was some inconvenience and extra 
expense, the strike did not appear to cause a major communications 
crisis. 
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As the strike progressed, however, the patience of the public 
began to wear thin, and pressure mounted for legislation to end the 
walkout. The government's position was awkward indeed. It was 
reluctant to withdraw the right to strike on the very first occasion 
upon which it had been exercised, and it was equally hesitant to 
undertake the task of suppressing the almost certain defiance which 
a back-to-work order would bring. On the other hand, the govern-
ment could hardly afford to capitulate to union demands. The 
postal workers were seeking wage increases beyond those which had 
been accepted by unions subject to arbitration; moreover, it was 
doubtful that the militant union members would even accept 
any recommendation made by its negotiating team. Thus, while the 
government was under increasing pressure to end the strike, it could 
not afford to reach a settlement with the postal workers which would 
destroy the faith of other unions in the efficacy of the arbitration 
option. Finally, such factors as veiled threats of special antistrike 
legislation, increasing public hostility toward the strike, and finan-
cial pressure on the individual union members (who received no 
strike pay) helped to move the union toward settlement. After fur-
ther concessions by the employer and the vigorous and imaginative 
efforts of a special mediator, the parties reached an agreement. By 
a narrow margin, the union membership ratified the agreement, 
and the postal strike was over. 
The postal strike, then, can be seen either as vindicating the 
predictions of doom by detractors of the new statute or as proving 
the good sense of its draftsmen. Critics would contend that the Act 
proferred the right to strike to "irresponsible" unionists who used 
it at the first opportunity to the considerable inconvenience, if not 
the lasting detriment, of the country. Conversely, proponents of the 
Act might argue that a postal strike was inevitable, that the statute 
merely circumvented awkward problems of law enforcement, and 
that the community's actual loss was negligible. Moreover, they 
would contend that public inconvenience was a small price to pay 
for the preservation of free collective bargaining and that the ulti-
mate resolution of the conflict within the range of settlemen~ 
among bargaining units subject to arbitration augurs well for the 
future of the system. 
F. The Scope of Bargaining 
The Preparatory Committee had clearly recommended before 
passage of the Act "that legislation place no limitation on the 
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subject matter of discussion at the bargaining table .... "85 At the 
same time, it proposed that arbitration (the only method of dispute 
settlement then contemplated) be limited to controversies di-
rectly related to wages, hours, leave entitlement, and working con-
ditions. 
The entitlement of employees to superannuation, death benefit and 
accident compensation should continue to be governed by law. Fur-
thermore, it should be made clear that the subject-matter of arbitra-
tion may in no circumstance extend to the processes governing 
appointment, transfer, promotion, demotion, lay-off, discharge, dis-
cipline and classification.s6 
This attempt to permit an unlimited scope for negotiation while 
withholding the means of dispute resolution for some subjects may 
prove to be a source of difficulty, especially since arbitration has been 
supplemented by the strike option in the final version of the statute. 
A strike-potential union which is denied satisfaction on one of the 
"excluded" matters may simply become intransigent over those mat-
ters which are bargainable. Even where the union has opted 
for arbitration rather than the right to strike, such frustration 
would necessarily impair the bargaining process. The statute, as 
enacted, seems to make the scope of conciliation, arbitration, and 
collective agreements coterminous, 87 but it does not expressly re-
strict the scope of bargaining. The parties may discuss anything, 
but they are forbidden to insert any provision in a collective agree-
ment which would require the passage of new legislation (except 
for the purpose of appropriating funds) or which would detract 
from the operation of the other statutes enacted as part of the com-
prehensive scheme for Public Service employment relations.88 In 
addition, a general provision of the Act authorizes the government, 
by cabinet order, to exempt itself from doing anything contrary to 
the "safety or security of Canada or any state allied or associated 
with Canada."89 
The latter limitation is unlikely to present significant problems, 
but the former raises the possibility of a clash between the new col-
lective bargaining regime and the older civil service system. The 
Public Service Staff Relations Act prohibits an arbitration tribunal 
85. REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN ntE 
PUBLIC SERVICE 34 (Canada 1965). 
86. Id. 
87. §§ 56, 70(2), 86(2) of the Act. 
88. § 56 of the Act. 
89. § 112 of the Act. 
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or a conciliation board from dealing with "the standards, pro-
cedures or processes governing the appointment . . . demotion, 
transfer, lay-off, or release" of employees.90 The Public Service Em-
ployment Act confers upon the Public Service Commission "the ex-
clusive right and authority to make appointments,"91 as well as a 
mandate not only to "establish the merit of candidates" for appoint-
ment92 but also to oversee the processes of promotion, demotion, 
and lay-off. 93 Yet it is almost inevitable that unions will seek to 
influence the determination of standards governing these important 
incidents of employment. Would a strike aimed at such an objec-
tive be unlawful? Even if it were, will not the existence of a deeply 
felt concern require a vehicle for its amicable resolution? Will not 
the absence of such a vehicle haunt the collective bargaining pro-
cess? 
The Act does not provide a mechanism for easing possible ten-
sions between the civil service system and the collective bargaining 
process, except that the Public Service Commission is required 
"from time to time [to] consult with representatives of any em-
ployee organization certified as a bargaining agent ... or with the 
employer ... with respect to the selection standards ... or the 
principles governing the appraisal [and] promotion ... of em-
ployees . . . ."94 That this potential area of difficulty has not yet 
given rise to public controversy is due in part to the characteristic 
pragmatism demonstrated by both unions and government admin-
istrators in the Public Service, in part to a traditional Canadian 
diffidence toward litigation. 
G. Implementation and Administration of Collective 
Agreements: Grievances 
Whether a collective agreement is the product of negotiation 
or an arbitration award, it is final and binding upon the employer, 
the bargaining agent, and the employees in the bargaining unit.95 
In one short passage, the Preparatory Committee brushed aside both 
the practical and philosophical objections to such a provision: 
[I]n many areas, the traditional authority of the Crown has been 
90. § § 70(3), 86(3) of the Act. 
91. C. 71, § 8, [1966-67) Can. Stat. 
92. Id. at §§ IO, 12, 31. 
93. Id. at §§ 13-21 (promotion), 31 (demotion), 29 (layoff). 
94. Id. at § 12(3). 
95. §§ 58, 72 of the Act. 
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circumscribed by laws that limit its freedom of action or require 
its action to be brought to the attention of Parliament. The con-
clusion to which we have come can be simply stated: although 
the arbitration of disputes represents a limitation on the historic 
right of the Crown to determine unilaterally the terms and condi-
tions of employment of those in its service, it is not likely to 
interfere with the capacity of the Government to discharge its re-
sponsibility.96 
That senior civil servants should give such short shrift to the 
prerogatives asserted by their predecessors in office and their con-
freres in other jurisdictions was, as the title of this Article suggests, 
either an act of folly or one of candor and courage. Of course, 
implementation of a collective agreement is "subject to the appro-
priation by or under the authority of Parliament of any moneys 
that may be required by the employer therefor."97 The Act, while 
acknowledging that the legislature retains ultimate control over the 
public purse, assumes that Parliament will routinely honor agree-
ments and awards made in accordance with its provisions. Since the 
majority party in the House of Commons controls the executive 
branch of government, it is unlikely that this statutory assumption 
will prove to be ill-founded. 
In order to facilitate implementation of the Act during the 
initial round of negotiations, Parliament established a statutory 
timetable for bargaining which provided that the first agreements 
negotiated in each occupational category would all expire on a 
specified date.98 The legislators added a statutory stipulation that 
collective agreements could be signed only after a certain date99 and 
for a minimum term of one year.100 These provisions were intended 
to bring the first (and hopefully subsequent) agreements in each 
bargaining unit into a regular cycle of periodic pay revisions for 
the entire Public Service. The obvious desirability of such an ar-
rangement, however, collided with the imponderables of a collective 
bargaining system: delays in certification due to union rivalry or 
simple inexperience in organizing, delays in bargaining due to 
intraunion political processes, overwork of the employer representa-
tives, or the predictable failure of negotiators to agree promptly on 
all outstanding issues. To cite but one example, the postal strike 
96. REPORT, supra note 85, at 37. 
97. §§ 56, 74 of the Act. 
98. § 26(6) of the Act. 
99. § 26(6) of the Act. 
100. § 57 of the Act. 
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was settled less than two months before the date fixed by law for 
the expiration of the first collective agreements. While the mini-
mum statutory term of one year could have been satisfied by making 
this agreement retroactive, raw memories of the recent strike made 
the prospect of a fresh round of negotiations in two months too 
awful to contemplate. The parties ingeniously agreed, therefore, 
to sign two agreements, one to operate retroactively and expire on 
the date specified by the Act, the other to come into effect and 
operate from that date forward. With the wisdom of hindsight, it 
seems clear that Parliament should have established a more flexible 
statutory timetable. However, the timing of representation ques-
tions-certification of new bargaining agents, severance of bargain-
ing units, and decertification-was fixed by reference to the expira-
tion dates of the initial agreements.101 Thus, to have allowed a more 
protracted period for the first round of negotiations would have 
further postponed the opportunity for minority and dissident 
groups to seek a change in representation. 
Turning to the question of grievances, the Act's provisions are 
indeed liberal. An employee aggrieved by unilateral employer action 
relating to employment, by a collective agreement or arbitral award, 
or by "any occurrence or matter affecting his terms and conditions 
of employment" may present a grievance.102 In one respect, this 
broad-gauged grievance process is apparently designed more for 
catharsis than for confrontation. The employee cannot pursue his 
grievance to adjudication unless it involves "the interpretation or 
application in respect of him of a provision of a collective agree-
ment or an arbitral award, or ... disciplinary action resulting in 
discharge, suspension or a financial penalty . . . ."103 In all other 
cases, the grievance can be pursued only through discussions with 
successively higher levels of management, up to (but not including) 
the Minister responsible. 
The private sector would do well to emulate some of the griev-
ance procedures in the Act. First, the right to pursue grievances is 
not delimited by the collective agreement alone. Thus, the oppor-
tunity exists for an employee to bring to the attention of senior 
management officials sources of friction or incidents of lower-level 
maladministration not covered by the contract. Second, the right to 
seek adjudication of grievances in the critical area of discipline is 
101. §§ 26, 41 of the Act. 
102. § 90(l)(b) of the Act. 
103. § 91 of the Act. 
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statutory rather than contractual. As such, it extends to all em-
ployees, whether or not they are covered by a collective agreement 
and whether or not they are even eligible for inclusion in a bar-
gaining unit.104 Third, a balance is carefully struck between indi-
vidual and group interests. An individual employee "owns" his 
personal grievance, but he may not challenge the interpretation or 
application of a collective agreement or arbitral award unless he has 
the approval and assistance of his union.105 Since the interpretation 
of the collective agreement might set a precedent which would affect 
the entire bargaining unit, the certified bargaining agent retains 
exclusive control over such grievances (except in relation to disci-
pline) by monitoring individual claims. If no bargaining agent is 
certified, of course, the e~ployee may seek representation by the 
union of his personal preference. The Act also permits either party 
to a collective agreement to file a grievance if the matter is not one 
which may be the subject of a grievance by an individual em-
ployee.106 
Adjustment of grievances is the task of a corps of "adjudicators," 
one of whom, as chief adjudicator, assumes responsibility for the 
administration of the system. Adjudicators hold office for fixed 
terms, and are assigned to individual cases as they arise.107 Alterna-
tively, the parties may consent to adjudication by a tripartite board108 
or by an adjudicator named in their collective agreement.109 Neither 
alternative device has yet been used. Although much can be said for 
naming an adjudicator in an agreement (or, indeed, on an ad hoc 
basis, by mutual designation), two considerations militate against the 
use of such a system: first, the obvious desire to preserve uniformity 
of decision throughout the Public Service,11° and second, the fact that 
the public bears the cost of grievance adjustment through the regular 
104. Section 2(p)(i) of the Act provides that managerial personnel are eligible to sub• 
mit and process grievances. Ironically, the first grievance to be adjudicated after the 
legislation came into force was that of a personnel manager who was found to have 
been improperly discharged, Caron case, file 166C-l (unreported, Sept. 21, 1967). 
105. §§ 90(2), 91(2) of the Act. 
106. § 98 of the Act. 
107. §§ 92, 94 of the Act. 
108. §§ 93, 94(2)(b) of the Act. 
109. § 94(2)(a) of the Act. 
110. To some extent this is achieved by the exercise of the chief adjudicator's 
power to determine whether a grievance falls within the jurisdictional limits defined 
in the Act and whether it is timely. PSSRB Regulations and Rules of Procedure, 
SOR/67-200, as amended by SOR/68-114, § 53. Moreover, all "policy" grievances (i.e. 
those filed by the employer or the bargaining agent) must be heard by the chief 
adjudicator. § 98 of the Act. 
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adjudicators.111 The decisions of an adjudicator are binding on the 
parties,112 and may be enforced113 or reviewed only by the PSSRB;114 
court review is precluded.115 Finally, those matters which fall within 
the purview of the Public Service Commission cannot be made the 
subject either of a grievance or of adjudication116 
Surprisingly, the first eighteen months under the new legislative 
scheme have yielded barely seventy grievances for adjudication, and 
of these over one half were held to be nonjusticiable on procedural 
or jurisdictional grounds. In part, the paucity of cases reflects the 
preoccupation of the parties with the processes of certification and 
negotiation, in part their desire to be reasonable during the difficult 
initial period of adjustment. It may also reflect the absence of col-
lective agreements which would provide a source both of new 
employee rights and of interpretative difficulties. However, an 
approach to adjudication has at least been articulated in terms 
which may well determine its future development: 
The whole spirit and intent of the Public Service Staff Relations 
Act is to secure to the governmental employees covered by it ... a 
regime of fair dealing which reflects concepts of industrial justice 
as they have developed in the private sector. To be sure, these con-
cepts are expressed through institutions and rules which give due 
weight to the special characteristics of public employment. But the 
underlying principles of the new statute are to be taken as the ex-
pression of this aspiration, rather than as the haggard reflection of 
past policies .... 111 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I have ventured into considerable-perhaps excessive-detail in 
describing the new Canadian federal statute out of a conviction 
that it represents the "emperor's clothes" approach to the problems 
of public service employment relations. Like the small boy in the 
old folk tale, I share to a considerable degree the conviction of the 
lll. § 97 of the Act. Subsections (2) and (3) provide that the Board may recover 
some or all of the costs of normal adjudication, but to date this has not been done. 
If the parties elect to name their own adjudicator, they must bear the costs. Thus, 
financial incentives do encourage the use of the regular adjudicators. 
ll2. §§ 96(4), 96(5) of the Act. 
ll3. § 96(6) of the Act. 
ll4. Section 23 of the Act provides for review by the PSSRB only of a "question of 
law or jurisdiction" arising in connection with grievance adjudication. Such questions 
may not be raised in the course of a proceeding to enforce the decision of an 
adjudicator. § 96(6) of the Act. 
II5. § 100 of the Act. 
ll6. § 90 of the Act. 
117. Caron case, supra note 104. 
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draftsmen of the statute that unwarranted deference to the imagi-
nary trappings of governmental authority has blinded us to the 
naked realities of life. In functional terms, at least, many of the 
arguments raised against the extension of collective bargaining to 
public employees are merely ghosts of the objections to collective 
bargaining in the private sector which were laid to rest a generation 
or more ago. 
This is not to say that public employment presents no special 
problems, or that the new Canadian statute adequately deals with 
all such problems. Undoubtedly, there will be difficulties in imple-
menting the dual system of dispute settlement, in maintaining ap-
propriate relationships between competing claims for limited public 
funds, in reconciling a collective bargaining system with the pla-
tonic ideal of a civil service system, and in withstanding the tempta-
tions of unions and employing agencies to use public opinion and 
political pressure as a supplement to conventional bargaining 
tactics. But these reservations do not undercut the basic validity of 
the legislation. 
The ultimate justification for the Public Service Staff Relations 
Act lies in its recognition of the need to normalize public service 
employment. It is quite clear that public employees in Canada (as 
well as in the United States) will no longer acquiesce in the denial 
to them of rights now regarded as basic by their fellow employee-
citizens in the private sector. As many public employers are coming 
to realize, the choice is not between collective bargaining and uni-
lateral control by a sovereign employer. Rather, it is between 
orderly collective bargaining and chaotic, extralegal conflict. 
